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CHAPTER 6 
Corporations 
BERTRAM H. LOEWENBERG 
§6.I. Use of corporate assets for benefit of controlling stockholders. 
Controlling stockholders in a corporation are frequently tempted to 
use corporate assets for their personal benefit, particularly in the closely 
held company. In three decisions during the 1958 SURVEY year such 
allegedly improper use was challenged, in two instances by minority 
stockholders and in a third by a trustee in bankruptcy. Although only 
one of the challenges was successful, all three cases illustrate techniques 
employed by dominant stockholders in acquiring or perpetuating con-
trol over corporate enterprises. 
In both Braunstein v. Devine1 and Widett v. Pilgrim Trust CO.2 in-
dividuals owning all or substantially all of the capital stock of the 
corporations in question sold their shares to buyers who were unable 
or unwilling to pay the entire purchase price in cash. In Braunstein 
the buyers, as directors of the corporation, caused it to borrow funds 
which were used in part payment of the buyers' personal obligation to 
pay for the stock. The method employed in the Widett case was simi-
lar; the buyers gave their own note for the balance of the purchase 
price but secured it with a chattel mortgage o~ the corporation's prop-
erty. Subsequently corporate funds were used in partial satisfaction 
of the buyers' note. For reasons set forth below the minority stock-
holder who attacked the payments in the Braunstein case was successful, 
while the trustee in bankruptcy who sought to recover the payments 
made in the W idett case was denied relief. 
McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co.s arose in the Federal District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts, but since it involved a domestic corpora-
tion and an analysis of Massachusetts corporate law, it is relevant to 
this discussion. In the case the plaintiff, the largest single stockholder 
BERTRAM H. LOEWENBERG is a partner in the firm of Sherburne, Powers and 
Needham, Boston. He was lecturer in law at Boston University School of Law. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of Mario L. Simeola of 
the Board of Student Editors of the ANNUAL SURVEY. 
§6.I. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 671, 149 N.E.2d 628. For further comment on this 
case, see §6.2 infra. 
2336 Mass. 738, 148 N.E.2d 167 (1958). For further comment on this case, see 
§6.3 infra. 
S 157 F. Supp. 560 (D. Mass. 1957), aU'd, 257 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1958). For further 
comment on this case, see §6.4 infra. 
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of a corporation whose shares were listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change, attacked the validity of a stock option plan under which em-
ployees designated by management were given options to purchase 
shares upon extremely generous instalment terms. The plaintiff 
asserted that the plan had been conceived by management principally 
for the purpose of putting additional votes into friendly hands and 
thus constituted an unlawful manipulation of voting power for the 
benefit of management. Although the plaintiff was unsuccessful on 
the merits, the case shows how a perfectly legitimate device, such as an 
employees' stock option plan, under some circumstances may be per-
verted to improper ends. 
§6.2. Acquiescence as bar to minority stockholder's suit. Although 
the use of corporate funds to pay the personal obligations of the ma-
jority stockholders in the Braunstein easel was clearly improper, the 
conduct of the complaining minority stockholder nearly barred him 
from maintaining his suit. After the payments in question had been 
made, the defendants made a full report of what had transpired at two 
successive annual stockholders' meetings. At both meetings the plain-
tiff asked several questions and made a number of motions which were 
voted down. Thereafter at each meeting a vote was passed ratifying 
". . . all action taken and all things done by the officers and directors 
of this corporation for the year just past," 2 including the corporate 
payments subsequently challenged by the plaintiff. The ratification 
resolutions were unanimously adopted by all the stockholders present, 
including a minority who had no connection with the payments, but 
the plaintiff neither voted for nor against the resolutions. The lower 
court found that the plaintiff's conduct constituted ratification and 
barred him from maintaining the suit as a matter of law. On appeal 
this ruling was reversed on the ground that in the particular circum-
stances the plaintiff's failure to vote did not indicate an assent to the 
action of the stockholders but rather a realization that a negative vote 
or vocal objection would have had little or no effect on the other stock-
holders.3 
Although it is generally held that a stockholder in a derivative suit 
cannot attack directors' actions in which he has acquiesced,4 most of 
the cases so holding involve situations in which the plaintiff either 
participated in the alleged wrongdoing or assented to a continuing 
course of conduct.1i In Braunstein the misuse of corporate funds was 
a fait accompli when reported to the plaintiff. Thus no estoppel could 
be asserted against him as might have been the case if the defendants' 
improper actions had continued subsequent to and in reliance upon 
the alleged acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff. 
§6.2. 1 Braunstein v. Devine, 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 671, 149 N.E.2d 628. 
21958 Mass. Adv: Sh. at 674, 149 N.E.2d at 630. 
31958 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 675, 149 N.E.2d at 631. 
4 Uccello v. Golden Foods, Inc., 325 Mass. 319, 90 N.E.2d 530 (1950); Dunphy v. 
Traveller Newspaper Assn., 146 Mass. 495, 16 N.E. 426 (1888). 
Ii See, e.g., cases cited in note 4 supra. 
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There are surprisingly few reported decisions which serve as a guide 
to a shareholder with reference to his conduct at a stockholders' meet-
ing.6 Most of the cases dealing with acquiescence involve inaction or 
informal conduct by the stockholder unrelated to a stockholders' meet-
ing, which a court construes as evidence of assent.7 Clearly in the 
Braunstein case the plaintiff would have been better advised to have 
voted specifically against the ratification resolutions. By failing to vote 
his conduct was sufficiently ambiguous to induce the trial court to rule 
against him, so that a case which might have been won in the first 
instance had to be carried to the appellate court in order for the plain-
tiff to sustain his position. 
§6.3. Use of corporate funds to satisfy stockholders' obligations. 
The bootstrap operation by which the purchasers of the capital stock 
of a corporation use the corporation's own funds to pay for the shares 
bought by them withstood attack in Widett v. Pilgrim Trust Co.,! al-
though the identity of the parties had a direct bearing on the result. 
Here the unsuccessful plaintiff was a trustee in bankruptcy rather than 
a minority stockholder, and the defendant that received the allegedly 
improper payments was a bank, to whom the note of the purchasers 
had eventually been transferred. Nevertheless, the basic holding of 
the case is that the mortgage on the corporation's property securing the 
buyers' note was a valid corporate obligation,2 and the manner in 
which the Supreme Judicial Court reached this interesting conclusion 
requires a somewhat detailed recital of the facts. 
George owned all of the capital stock of two corporations: Tremont, 
which operated a restaurant on Tremont Street, Boston; and Atlantic, 
which operated a restaurant known as The Lobster House in Charles-
town. The buyers agreed to purchase all of the shares of Tremont 
from George for $80,000, subject to certain adjustments and George's 
agreement to pay all outstanding obligations of Tremont. The pur-
chase price was to be paid by cash payments of $25,000 together with 
the buyers' note for $55,000, secured by a pledge of the stock and a 
mortgage upon substantially all the personal property of Tremont. 
In a separate document executed contemporaneously with the first 
agreement, George granted to the buyers the right to use the name 
"The Lobster House" in the operation of the Tremont Street restau-
rant; agreed to sell to the buyers lobsters for their restaurant at the 
same price charged to Atlantic for its lobsters; and agreed to mention 
"The Lobster House" at Tremont Street in all advertising for "The 
Lobster House" in Charlestown operated by Atlantic. In consider-
6 In State National Loan Be Trust Co. v. Fuller, 26 Tex. Civ. App. lII8, 63 S.W. 552 
(1901), a stockholder who remained silent at a stockholders' meeting when certain 
proposals were discussed was held to be estopped from later protesting the validity 
of the proposals. 
7 Johnson v. King-Richardson Co., 36 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1930); West Side Irrigation 
Co. v. United States, 246 Fed. 212 (9th Cir. 1917). 
§6.3. 1336 Mass. 738, 148 N.E.2d 167 (1958). 
2336 Mass. at 742,148 N.E.2d at 170. 
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ation of the grants contained in this agreement the buyers agreed to 
pay George a percentage of the gross receipts of the Tremont Street 
restaurant and to purchase all their lobsters from George. 
The buyers' note for $55,000 and the corporate mortgage securing it 
were delivered to George together with a certified copy of a vote of the 
directors of Tremont which recited that the mortgage was given " .. . 
to secure a promissory note given in consideration of a grant by .. . 
George to the Corporation of the right to use the name 'The Lobster 
House' in the conduct of the business of the Corporation." 3 George 
indorsed the buyers' note to Atlantic, which borrowed $41,000 from 
the defendant bank and pledged the note and assigned the Tremont 
mortgage as security for the loan. Payments totaling approximately 
$25,000 made by Tremont were credited to the buyers' note and to the 
$41,000 loan. About two years later Tremont was adjudicated a bank-
rupt, and the trustee in bankruptcy brought this action against the 
bank to recover the $25,000 in payments received from Tremont. 
In finding for the defendant the lower court ruled that "something 
in the nature of an equitable estoppel" 4 barred the trustee's claim. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, however, in overruling the plaintiff's ex-
ceptions, held that the mortgage was a valid corporate obligation on 
two principal grounds: (1) the unanimous consent of the stockholders 
barred any contention that the mortgage was merely for the accom-
modation of the stockholders;5 and (2) the giving of the mortgage was 
beneficial to the corporation in that the latter obtained the benefits set 
forth in George's second agreement such as the right to use the name 
"The Lobster House," the assurance of a supply of lobsters, and the 
like.6 
That the unanimous consent of the stockholders will validate what 
may otherwise be a questionable corporate transaction is a well-estab-
lished principle,7 and the Court was on firm ground in so ruling. This 
consent, of course, will not bar contemporaneous creditors from chal-
lenging the transaction,s but in the present case the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, appointed more than two years after the payments were made, 
undoubtedly represented subsequent creditors. In addition, the Court's 
suggestion that the defendant bank was entitled to rely upon the cer-
tificate of the directors' vote, reciting what appeared to be adequate 
consideration for the mortgage, is supported by an earlier leading Mas-
3336 Mass. at 741. 148 N.E.2d at 169. 
4336 Mass. at 739, 148 N.E.2d at 168. 
5336 Mass. at 742, 148 N.E.2d at 170. 
6336 Mass. at 744-745,148 N.E.2d at 171. 
7 Gilbert Manufacturing Co. v. Goldfine, 317 Mass. 681, 59 N.E.2d 461 (1945); 
Medlinsky v. Premium Cut Beef Co., 317 Mass. 25, 57 N.E.2d 31 (1944). But see 
Boston Box Co. v. Shapiro, 249 Mass. 373, 380, 144 N.E. 233, 235 (1924). 
S "Where the rights of creditors are not impaired, corporate funds may be used 
to pay the personal indebtedness of its officers or such funds may be transferred to 
them as gifts, if this is done with the assent of all the officers and stockholders." 
Gilbert Manufacturing Co. v. Goldfine, 317 Mass. 681, 688, 59 N.E.2d 461, 465 
(1945). 
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sachusetts case.D On these grounds, therefore, the ultimate result in 
the Widett case probably cannot be questioned. 
The tortuous reasoning, however, which the Court employed in rul-
ing in Widett that the mortgage was given for the benefit of the corpo-
ration is much more difficult to accept.10 Stripped of its frills, the 
mortgage on Tremont's property was executed to secure the note of the 
individuals given in payment for the capital stock of the company. 
This was a bold use of corporate funds to satisfy the debts of the stock-
holders, a practice which the Court might well have condemned in-
stead of striving to find that the corporation benefited from the trans-
action. From a realistic standpoint the alleged benefits received by the 
corporation from George under the second agreement appear to be in-
substantial and designed to conceal the fact that the corporate mort-
gage was given primarily to secure the personal obligations of the 
stockholders. Furthermore, George was to receive separate considera-
tion from the buyers under the second agreement, i.e., a percentage of 
the gross receipts of Tremont, a factor which tends to negate the find-
ing that the mortgage was given for the purposes of the corporation.ll 
§6.4. Validity of employees' stock option plan. The so-called re-
stricted stock option plan has become a popular method of granting 
deferred compensation to corporate employees since the adoption of 
the Revenue Act of 1942 which accorded these plans favorable income 
tax treatment.1 In the typical plan key employees designated by man-
agement are given an option to purchase shares of the corporation, 
normally aggregating a very small fraction of the outstanding stock, at 
a price usually equal to at least 95 percent of the current market price 
of the stock.2 The option is to be exercised within a period not exceed-
ing ten years3 from the date of the grant. The plan contemplates that 
the market price of the stock will increase and, of course, that the em-
ployees have an incentive to help bring about that result by diligent 
efforts on behalf of the company. 1£ the price does go up, the em-
D Commonwealth v. Reading Savings Bank, 137 Mass. 431 (1884). 
10 See 336 Mass. 738, 742, 743, 148 N.E.2d 167, 171 (1958). 
11336 Mass. at 745, 148 N.E.2d at 171. Another questionable ground relied upon 
by the Court to support the mortgage as a valid corporate act was based on the 
commitment of George in connection with the sale of the stock that all the obliga-
tions of Tremont would be paid. Although the mortgage made no reference to this 
commitment, the Court reasoned that the mortgage was validly given, in part at 
least, to secure the payment of the corporation's own debts. In so ruling the Court 
rejected the plaintiff's much sounder contention that the mortgage in this aspect 
actually secured the debt of another, namely, George's obligation to the buyers that 
the corporation would be free of debt. 
§6.4. 1 The statutory requirements of a restricted stock option are found in 
Section 421 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which reenacted the substantially 
similar provisions of Section 130A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 
2 The option price may be as low as 85 percent of the fair market value of the 
stock at the time the option is granted, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §421(d), but certain 
additional tax advantages accrue if the option price is 95 percent or greater. Id. 
§421(b). 
3 Id. §421(d)(1)(D). 
5
Loewenberg: Chapter 6: Corporations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 2012
68 1958 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §6.4 
ployees exercise their options, and the appreciation' in value i& not 
taxed to them until they sell the shares and then only at capital gains 
rates.4 
In McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co.5 the plaintiff owned 20,400 shares of 
the no par common stock of the defendant corporation out of a total of 
150,000 shares outstanding, and was the largest single stockholder. 
The officers and directors collectively owned less than 4000 shares.6 
The shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange. McPhail had 
attempted unsuccessfully to persuade the management that he should 
be elected to the board of directors. In 1955 the directors, subject to 
the approval of the stockholders, adopted a stock option plan to supple-
ment or supersede an earlier plan. The new plan had the following 
features: (1) 20,000 shares were to be available to employees with six 
months' service (a maximum of 500 shares could be allocated to any 
individual); (2) the employees and the number of shares covered by 
their options were to be determined by a committee of directors ineli-
gible to participate in the plan; (3) the options had to be exercised 
within thirty days; (4) an employee exercising the option could pay for 
the stock in instalments (including the application of dividends re-
ceived on the stock) over a period of up to ten years without paying any 
interest on unpaid balances; (5) upon paying the first instalment the 
employee became the owner of the shares and was entitled to full 
voting rights and dividend rights, although his stock was pledged to 
secure the balance of the purchase price. Furthermore, the right to 
pay for the stock in instalments ceased upon termination of employ-
ment. 
The plan was approved at a stockholders' meeting by a more than 
two-to-one majority. McPhail thereupon sought to enjoin the oper-
ation of the plan, asserting that it was illegal in several respects, princi-
pally that it was unconscionable to permit the use of dividends to pay 
for the stock and that the carrying out of the plan constituted an un-
lawful manipulation of voting power by management to perpetuate its 
controJ.7 The District Court found for the defendant, and its judg-
ment was affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals.8 
McPhail's first objection was an attack upon the payment of full 
dividends on stock being purchased on an instalment plan. In theory 
at least, the distribution of a full dividend to a participant in the stock 
option plan who had paid in only 10 percent of the purchase price was 
unfair to other stockholders who had paid 100 percent cash for their 
shares. The District Court rejected this argument by referring to "the 
well-settled proposition that dividends on outstanding stock must be 
paid equally on all stock of the same class," 9 although it cited no cases 
4 Id. §§421(a), (b). 
5157 F. Supp. 560 (D. Mass. 1957), aU'd, 257 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1958). The author's 
firm represented the plaintiff in this action. 
6257 F.2d at 390. 
7 157 F. Supp. 560, 562 (D. Mass. 1957). 
8257 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1958). 
9 157 F. Supp. 560, 562 (D. Mass. 1957). 
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for this rule. The Court of Appeals, in affirming on this point, re-
ferred to a series of Massachusetts statutes that permit stock to be paid 
for by instalments,lO allow payroll deductions for the purchase of stock 
pursuant to employee stock purchase plans,l1 and provide that in the 
absence of special provisions in the agreement of association every share 
of stock without par value is equal to every other share.12 It seems 
doubtful that this group of unrelated statutes should compel a decision 
that. full dividends had to be paid on the shares issued under the cir-
cumstances of this case. Yet the Court of Appeals held that to rule 
otherwise would be tantamount to a judicial amendment of the stat-
utes in question.13 The court conceded, however, that circumstances 
might arise in which equitable relief to minority stockholders would be 
warranted despite literal compliance with statutory provisions.14 
Perhaps the most interesting issue in the McPhail case involved the 
claim that the plan constituted an unlawful manipulation of voting 
power for the benefit of management and to the detriment of McPhail 
as the largest minority stockholder. The fiduciary obligations of di-
rectors in connection with the issuance of shares is well-established,15 
although the Court of Appeals suggested that the approval of the plan 
by the stockholders might have made that rule inapplicable in the 
present case.16 The court relied in part upon the finding of the lower 
court that the avowed purpose of the plan was to increase employee in-
centive,17 but the fact that the option arrangement covered 20,000 
shares, an amount almost identical with, and hence sufficient to neu-
tralize McPhail's holdings, led the Court of Appeals to consider the 
question of the directors' motives in promulgating the plan.18 
Here the court turned to the findings of a special master in an un-
successful state court suit brought in 1953 by McPhail to obtain access 
to the company's list of stockholders. The master had found that Mc-
Phail was a manipulator who wished to be elected a director so as to 
reduce dividends, and thereby depress the value of the stock in order 
that he might buy additional shares more cheaply. How a single di-
rector could have accomplished this against the opposition of the other 
members of the board is not clear, but in any event the court seems to 
be treading on dangerous ground here in relying upon the master's 
findings. In so doing the court tacitly approved the use of a stock 
option plan, ostensibly designed for employee incentive purposes, but 
10 G.L., c. 156, §15. 
11 Id., c. 154, §8. 
12 Id., c. 156, §14. 
13257 F.2d 388, 392 (1st Cir. 1958). 
14 257 F.2d at 392. 
15 Andersen v. Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 90 N.E.2d 541 (1950); Ballantine, 
Corporations §209 (rev. ed. 1946). 
16 257 F.2d 388, 394 (1st Cir. 1958). 
17 "While the avowed purpose of the Plan was to increase employee incentive, the 
result unquestionably is to neutralize, at least partially, McPhail's holdings. I am 
not prepared, however, to find that the Plan was designed solely, or even prin-
cipally, to achieve this result." 157 F. Supp. 560, 563 (D. Mass. 1957). 
18257 F.2d 388,395 (1st Cir. 1958). 
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very probably, as the court assumes, intended to neutralize the position 
of a minority stockholder objectionable to management. An earlier 
decision of this same court,19 moreover, indicates that in similar types 
of suits the motives of the plaintiff-stockholder, no matter how selfish, 
are irrelevant.2o Since the plan also contemplated the purchase by the 
company of shares on the open market in order to provide stock for the 
options,21 management was in effect using corporate funds to finance 
an arrangement the court assumed was designed to thwart McPhail 
and, incidentally, to insure a continuation of management's control.22 
§6.5. Distribution of assets of dissolved corporation: Directors' lia-
bility for liquidating dividends. The life of a Massachusetts corpora-
tion normally continues for a period of three years after its charter ex-
pires or its corporate existence is otherwise terminated.1 This statu-
tory extension is primarily a period of grace to permit the corporation 
to wind up its affairs gradually. Since the statute, although in some-
what awkward language, expressly permits the corporation " ... to 
dispose of and convey its property and to divide its capital stock 
19 In Johnson v. King-Richardson Co., 36 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1930), the court, in 
a derivative stockholders' suit charging the directors with permitting the majority 
stockholder to obtain personal profits at the expense of the corporation, held that 
even if the purpose of the plaintiff in bringing the suit was to drive the corporation 
out of business, that fact would not bar the action. Although the Johnson decision, 
unlike the McPhail case, was a derivative suit brought for the benefit of the cor-
poration, the acts complained of by McPhail wronged the corporation as well as 
him and might have been the subject of a minority stockholder's suit. 
20 The corporation in the Johnson case was organized in New Jersey, although 
its principal place of business was in Massachusetts. Although the opinion in that 
case relied primarily upon New Jersey decisions, since it was decided prior to Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938), the 
court was not compelled to follow New Jersey law. In any event Massachusetts and 
the bulk of authorities in other jurisdictions are in accord with the Johnson ruling. 
Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 408, 8 N.E.2d 895, 903 (1937); 
Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §5877 (rev. ed. 1943). 
21 257 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1958). 
22 McPhail also attacked the plan on the ground that it contemplated the grant-
ing of valuable options without consideration, and he cited a group of Delaware 
cases in which stock options granted to employees without any commitment on the 
part of the optionees to remain in the employ of the corporations had been held 
invalid for lack of consideration. Frankel v. Donovan, 120 A.2d 311, 34 A.L.R.2d 
852 (Del. Ch. 1956); Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 
(1952), reargument denied, 33 Del. Ch. 174, 91 A.2d 62 (1952); Rosenthal v. Burry 
Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 60 A.2d 106 (1948). The court distinguished the 
Delaware cases and pointed out that the Starrett options had to be exercised within 
30 days by the execution of a purchase agreement. Thus, even if the option lacked 
consideration, once the purchase agreement was signed by which the employee com-
mitted himself to buy the stock, this defect was remedied. As to the contention 
that the liberal instalment provisions made the options things of value to the com-
pany which might have been sold for a price, the court held that the company could 
expect to receive increased loyalty and effort from the participating employees, who 
would also remain with the company in order to take advantage of the interest-free 
instalment privilege of the plan. This privilege terminated upon the cessation of 
employment. 257 F.2d 388, 393-394 (1st Cir. 1948). 
§6.5. 1 G.L., c. 155, §51. 
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••• ," 2 presumably the directors have the right to make partial, and 
eventually final, distributions of assets among the stockholders. These 
distributions have been held to be dividends within the meaning of 
Section 37 of G.L., c. 156,3 so that directors authorizing these payments 
have been subject to potential liability under that statute if the cor-
poration was insolvent or bankrupt at the time, or was rendered so by 
the distribution. The directors' liability is limited to the amount of 
the dividend but includes responsibility for all debts or contracts, 
whether or not they existed at the time of the distribution.4 
To what extent this liability has in fact been enforced against di-
rectors of a corporation engaged in distributing its assets in liquidation 
is not clear, but the risk of such liability apparently persuaded the Gen-
eral Court to act. The new statute, Chapter 204 of the Acts of 1958,5 
provides a reasonable remedy. During the three-year grace period the 
corporation may file a petition in the Supreme Judicial Court or Su-
perior Court for leave to distribute the whole or part of its assets to 
stockholders. After notice by registered mail to the Commissioner of 
Corporations and all known creditors, and by publication, the Court 
may, after hearing, and a finding that the rights of creditors, including 
the Commonwealth, are reasonably protected, enter a decree permit-
ting the proposed distribution. Directors authorizing dividends or 
other distributions in accordance with the decree are absolved from the 
personal liability imposed by G.L., c. 156, §37. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Moseley v. Briggs Realty Co., 320 Mass. 278, 69 N.E.2d 7 (1946); Calkins v. Wire 
Hardware Co., 267 Mass. 52, 165 N.E. 889 (1929). 
4 Calkins v. Wire Hardware Co., 267 Mass. 52, 165 N.E. 889 (1929). 
5 This act added new Section 51A to G.L., c. 155. 
9
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